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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 1 
STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., CHARLES L. 1 1 Alh8 61 rQk@ 1 
- 
WINDER. JOHN MC HUGH. BRUCE 
BLICK, NEIL MILLER and JOHN X COMBO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
- 
St€ 
cc: Counsel of Record 
3TION FOR 
I 
i /I/ Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ORDER GRANTIN ) JUDICIAL NOTICE 
v 1 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 34485-2007 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) Twin Falls County District Court No 
PARTNERSHIP, ) 04-6336 
1 
December 23,2008, requesting this Court for an order to take judicial notice of the documents request! 
therein for the reason that issues have developed in the instant appeal regarding the significance a1 
admissibility of the Order of Condemnation and whether the Sharp case is controlling on those issuc 
Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE be, a 
hereby is, GRANTED and this Court shall take JUDICIAL NOTICE of the documents listed below 
Supreme Court Docket No. 26237, Ada County Hzghway Dzstrict v. Sharp, copies of which are attack 
to this Motion, and shall be placed into the augmentation record in the above entitled appeal: 
1. Ver~fied Complaint with attachments, file stamped March 6, 1997; and 
2 Brief in Supp rt of Appellant's Petition for Review, file stamped May 22,2001. 8! 
DATED this 1 day of January 2009. 
For the Supreme Co~ut 
:phen W. Ken) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - Docket No. 34485-2007 I 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., CHARLES L. 
WINDER, JOI3N MC HUGH, BRUCE 
SWEENEY, MONTE C. MC CLURE, GARY ) 
BLICK, NEIL MILLER and JOIm X COMBO, ) 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 1 
) 
ill Plaintifs-Appellants, 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSI-IIP, 
) ,ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
) JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Defendant-Respondent. 1 
1 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 34485-2007 
) Twin Falls County District Court No. 
) 04-6336 
Defendant. j 
A MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE with attachments was filed by counsel for Appellant on 
December 23,2008, requesting this Court for an order to take judicial notice of the documents requested 
therein for the reason that issues have developed in the instant appeal regarding the significance and 
admissibility of the Order of Condemnation and whether the Sharp case is controlling on those issues. 
Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION FOR SUDICIAL NOTICE be, and 
hereby is, GRANTED and this Court shall talce JUDICIAL NOTICE of the documents listed below in 
Supreme Court Docket No. 26237, Ada County Highway District v. Sharp, copies of which are attached 
to this Motion, and shall be placed into the augmentation record in the above entitled appeal: 
1. Verified Complaint with attachments, file stamped March 6, 1997; and 
of Appellant's Petition for Review, file stamped May 22,2001 
DATED this day of January 2009. 
For the Supreme Court. 
% q h  P e c l p  
Stephen W. Kenyon, Cll'erlc 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - Docket NO. 34485-2007 
- 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEYGENERAL 
CHRIS KRONBERG 
KARL D. VOGT 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
33 11 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
ISB #4151 
ISB #5015 
Counsel for Appellant 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 




) MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
1 
1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 1 




Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District for Twin Falls County. 
I-Ionorable Judge Nathan Higer presiding. 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through undersigned counsel, and pursuant to 
Rule 201, I.R.E., hereby asks this Court to take judicial notice of the record in Ada County 
Iiighway District v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888, 26 P.3d 1225 (Ct.App. 2001), Docket No. 26237, for 
the reason that issues have developed in the instant case regarding the significance and 
issues. Specifically, the State has appealed the admissibility at trial of the Order of 
Condemnation and its use as a basis for a jury instruction based on the holding of Sharp. 
Respondent Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership (Canyon Vista) has responded that Sharp 
is inapposite because the facts of Sharp are different in that the complaint in Sharp was silent on 
the issue of access rights, and that there was a conflict between the order of condemnation and 
complaint in Sharp. In doing so, Canyon Vista has injected into this matter the precise nature of 
the complaint and order of condemnation in Sharp. 
The decision in Sharp does not provide sufficient detail to address the assertion by 
Canyon Vista that the complaint was silent on the issue of the condemnation of access rights or 
whether the complaint conflicted with the order of condemnation. Therefore, the State would 
like this Court to review certain documents, specifically the Verified Complaint and the Brief in 
Support of Appellant's Petition for Review, in order to address those issues. The State believes 
it is of significance that counsel for Canyon Vista was also counsel for Sharp, so that arguments 
made by counsel on these issues in Sharp are relevant to the arguments being made by counsel in 
the instant appeal regarding whether there was conflict between the complaint and order of 
condemnation in Sharp. 
This Court has taken judicial notice of its own files and records in at least one other case. 
See, State v. Tisdel, 98 Idaho 551, 552, 568 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1977). The court of appeals has 
taken judicial notice of the record in a case separate from the one it was reviewing on appeal in 
order to determine evidence of legislative intent. See, Knopp v. Nelson, 116 Idaho 343, 345,775 
P.2d 657,659 (Ct.App. 1989). Rule 201, I.R.E., permits a court to take judicial notice of its own 
records in the same or a separate case, and such judicial notice can occur at any point in the 
proceedings. 
MOTION FOR JUDICIAL, NOTICE - 2 
The documents that the State requests that this Court take judicial notice of are the 
Verified Complaint and the Brief in Support of Appellant's Petition for Review from the Sharp 
records. Those two documents are attached hereto. 
Respecthlly submitted this 23rd day of December 2008. 
CHRIS KRONBERG 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of December, 2008, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
E Don Copple 
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox 
P.O. Box 1583 
Boise, ID 83701 
John Lezamiz 
133 Shoshone St N 
PO Box 389 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0389 
movernight Mail 
[Zl~elecopy (Fax) - 386-9428 
m a i l  
m ~ a n d  Delivered 
movernight Mail 
m ~ e l e c o ~ y  (Fax) 208-734-4 1 15 
MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - 3 

Kimbell D. Gourley 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW 
& MCKLVEEN, Chartered 
300 North Sixth Street 
Post Office Box 1368 
Boise, ldaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Attorneys for: Ada County Highway District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, ) 
a body politic corporate ) 
of the State of Idaho, ) 
c v  BC 9f0.11488 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
SHARON L. SHARP, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. 
) 
) VERIFIED COMPLAINT 




COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Ada County Highway District, a body politic 
corporate of the state of ldaho ("ACHD"), by and through its counsel of record, Eberle, 
Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, and as and for a claim against the 
Defendants, complains and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff, ACHD, is a body politic corporate of the state of ldaho, duly and 
legally organized and created pursuant to, and by virtue of, the laws of the state of 
4% 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT -1- 
Idaho, and exercising its powers by and through its duly elected, qualified and acting 
commissioners, Sherry R. Huber, Susan S. Eastlake, and Gary E. Richardson. 
2. The Defendant, Sharon L. Sharp, is an individual who at all times relevant 
hereto resided in Eagle, ldaho ("Sharp"), and who also owns an undivided interest in 
that certain real property located at 127 North Eagle Road, Eagle, ldaho 8361 6, which 
is more particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto (the "Property"). 
3. ACMD, by this action, seeks to (i) take and condemn a portion of the 
Property for right-of-way, and (ii) obtain a permanent easement on an additional 
portion of the Property, for a public purpose, namely, the alignment, reconstruction, 
and widening of the North Eagle Road from the Eagle By-Pass to State Street, ACHD 
Project No. 52056.0 (the "Construction Project"). 
4. The above entitled court has jurisdiction and venue over this action 
pursuant to ldaho Code 57-706. 
CLAIM FOR EMINENT DOMAIN O N  PROP= 
5. ACHD has, pursuant to the laws of the state of Idaho, including, but not 
limited to, ldaho Code 57-701, the power of eminent domain. 
6. On or about February 19, 1997, the ACHD Board of Commissioners 
entered an order of condemnation in relation to a portion of Property, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
7. That the Defendant Sharp, is the owner, or the reputed owner of the 
Property. 
8. That ACHD seeks to take, condemn, and obtain in fee title only a portion 
of the Property belonging to the Defendant Sharp, which portion of land consists of 
VERLFIED COMPLAINT -2- 
approximately .00238 acres, or I00 square feet, more or less, and is more particularly 
described on Exhibit A - I  attached hereto (the "Right-of-way Property"). 
9. ACHD further seeks to take and obtain a permanent easement on a 
portion of the Property belonging to the Defendant Sharp, which portion of land 
consists of: 
(i) approximately .0433 acres, or 1,888 square feet, more or less, 
and is more particularly described on Exhibit "A-2" attached 
hereto; 
(ii) approximately .0107 acres, or 466 square feet, more or less, and 
is more particularly described on Exhibit 'w attached hereto 
(collectively the "Permanent Easement Property). 
10. A map of the Construction Project showing the location of Right-of-way 
Property, and Permanent Easment Property, and the beginning and ending termini of 
the Construction Project is attached hereto as Exhibit "C", and, by this reference, 
made a part hereof as if set out in full. 
11. That the taking of the Right-of-way Property and Permanent Easement 
Property is necessary for public use as part of the Construction Project, which has 
been and is located in a manner that is most compatible with the general public good, 
and causes the least private injury, and such taking is authorized by law. 
12. That ACHD has employed the appraisal services of David M. Ambrose, 
MAI, doing business as Ambrose Appraisal Company, to perform an appraisal upon 
Right-of-way Property and Permanent Easement Property, and Mr. Ambrose has 
placed a fair market value on: 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 3 -  
(a) the Right-of-way Property in the total sum of $700 based upon a square 
footage of 100 square feet and a fair market value per square foot of 
$7.00; 
(b) the Permanent Easement Property in the total sum of $12,970 based 
upon the following: 
(i) a square footage of 1,888 square feet and a fair market value per 
square foot of $7.00 times 75% for a total sum of $9,912; 
(ii) a square footage of 466 square feet and a fair market value per 
square foot of $7.00 times 75% for a total sum of $3,058; 
(c) improvements taken in the condemnation in the total sum of $1,110. 
13. ACHD has sought in good faith to  purchase from Defendant sharp the 
Right-of-way Property and the Permanent Easement Property, for the purpose 
aforesaid. Defendant Sharp has refused, and continues to  refuse, to grant said 
property to  ACHD for the proposed public use, and the Defendant Sharp has refused, 
and still refuses, to negotiate with ACHD for the fair market value of said property. 
ACHD has been unable to make any reasonable bargain therefor or to negotiate with 
Defendant Sharp for the said property or the damages, if any, resulting from the said 
property being taken from the Property. 
14. On or about February 25, 1997, ACHD extended an offer to Defendant 
Sharp to purchase the Right-of-way Property, Permanent Easement Property, and the 
improvements taken thereon, for their fair market value in the sum of $1 4,780, plus 
a $1,478 premium, for a total sum of $16,258, and Defendant Sharp apparently 
rejected the same by failing to respond. A true and correct copy of said purchase offer 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT -4 -  
is attached hereto as Exhibit "D", and, by this reference, incorporated herein as 
though set forth in full. 
15. That ACHD has had to employ Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & 
McKlveen, Chartered, to  prosecute this action on its behalf, and ACHD is entitled to 
a reasonable attorney's fee in the sum of $2,500 if judgment is entered by default, 
and such other sums as the court deems reasonable i f  the matter is contested. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, the Ada County Highway District, prays forjudgment 
against the Defendant as follows: 
A. That the Plaintiff, Ada County Highway District shall be entitled to 
judgment condemning the Right-of-way Property, and Permanent Easement Property, 
for the said public use; 
B. That just compensation for the taking be ascertained and awarded to 
Defendant in the order of priority that the court determines is just and equitable; 
C. That Ada County Highway District be entitled to attorney's fees and 
costs as permitted pursuant to ldaho Code 57-71 8 and such other statutes as may be 
applicable including, but not limited to, ldaho Code § 12-1 20 and ldaho Code § 12-1 21. 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW & 
MCKLVEEN, CHARTERED A 
_J' 
Kimbell [I.  ourl lev^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
. (9 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT - 5 -  
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO 




RAY PUTMAN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he is a Right-of-way Specialist for the Plaintiff, Ada County Highway 
District, in the above-entitled matter; that he has read the above and foregoing verified 
complaint, knows the contents thereof, and that the statements contained therein are 
true t o  the best: of his information, knowledge and belief. 
Ra h t m a n  + 
SU.B,SCRiBED AND SWORN to  before me this 
I ,. , ,::. . , 1 p 1  
hk day of March, 1997 
., . ,  . , > .. . 'i. .-,.   ....;( ,,,, 
, s 
, . . :,. . , . ,, , . ,.,:-. ... .. , * ., . . I . . ... . .. 
.<<$ j. ,. ...., , ... .,? ,3 y:, 
* v . .  .:. . . . ., .. . .  ...: . :*;s: . 
. . >  : ;5"  .;.. . \.~.r>~y$ . . . ', . 9.; .?.. .  . ,. . ,r>.>,,' . . ., ... , . i "~" '  . , . .  . Commission expires: - ( 11( 2-99 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT -6- 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION ,continued) FILE NO: 40187  
P 
RANGE 1 EAST, B.M., EAGLE, ADA COUNTY, IDAHO ANE BEING MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS 
FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT A POINT MARKING THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 8; THENCS 
NORTH 6 6 7 . 1 1  FEET ALONG THE EAST LINE OF SAID SECTION 8  TO A POINT; THENCE SOUTH 8 1  
DEGREES 5 5 ' 0 0 "  WEST 3 3 . 3 3  FEET TO A POINT ON THE NORTHERLY BANK OF THE DRAINAGE DITCX, 
SAID POINT BEING THE REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; THENCE ALONG SAID NORTHERLY BANK OF THS 
DRAINAGE DITCEITHE FOLLOWING COURSES AND DISTANCES: SOUTH 8 1  DEGREES 5 5 ' 0 0 "  WEST 74.68 
FEET; THENCE SOUTH 5 7  DEGREES 5 5 '  0 0 "  WEST 8 6 . 0 0  FEET; THENCE SOUTH 32 DEGREES 5 7 '  0 0 "  WEST 
4 8 . 7 0  FEET; THENCE LEAVING SAID B V K  OF THE DRAINAGE DITCH NORTH 4 DEGREES 0 3 ' 2 8 "  WEST 
1 0 3 . 4 4  FEET; THENCE NORTH 1 DEGREES 1 0 ' 1 0 "  WEST 1 5 8 . 6 8  FEET TO A POINT ON THE SOUTH 
BOUNDARY OF AIKEN'S SECOND ADDITION TO EAGLE, AS FILED FOR RECORD IN THE OFFICE OF TI-IE ADA 
COUNTY RECORDER, BOISE, IDAHO; THENCE ALONG SAID SOUTH BOUNUARY OF AIKEN'S ADDITION XORTH 
9 0  DEGREES 0 0 ' 0 0 "  EAST 1 8 3 . 8 5  FEET TO A POINT ON THE WEST RIGHT OF WAY LINE OF NORTH EAGLE 
RD.; THENCE ALONG SAID WEST RIGHT OF WAY LINE SOUTH 0  DEGREES 0 0 ' 0 0 "  WEST 1 6 4 . 7 8  FEET TO 
THE POINT OF BEGINNING 
ALSO 
A TRACT OF LAND BEING A PORTION OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 8 ,  TOWNSHIP 4  NORTK, 
RANGE 1 EAST, B.M., EAGLE, ADA COUNTY, IDAHO AND BEING MORE PARTICULURLY DESCRIBED AS 
FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT A POINT MARKING THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 8; THENC3 
NORTH 5 6 7 . 2 0  FEET ALONG THE EAST LINE OF SAID SECTION 8  TO A POINT; THENCE SOUTH 8 8  
DEGREES 3 8 ' 3 1 "  WEST 3 3 . 0 1  FEET TO A POINT ON THE WEST RIGHT OF WAY LINE OF NORTH EAGLZ 
RD., SAID POINT BEING THE REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; THENCE CONTINUING SOUTH 8 8  DEGRXES 
3 8 ' 3 1 "  WEST 1 3 5 . 9 3  FEET TO A POINT ON THE SOUTHERLY BANK OF THE DRAINAGE DITCH; THENCS 
ALONG SAID SOUTHERLY BANK OF THE DRAINAGE DITCH NORTH 5 2  DEGREES 2 5 ' 0 0 "  EAST 7 3 . 2 0  FZET; 
THENCE CONTINUING ALONG ALONG SAID SOUTHERLY BANK OF THE DRAINAGE DITCH NORTH 7 0  DEG2ESS 
0 0 ' 0 0 "  EAST 8 2 . 8 8  FEET TO A POINT ON THE SAID WEST RIGHT OF WAY LINE OF NORTH EAGLE ?J.; 
THENCE SOUTH 0  DEGREES 0 0 ' 0 0 "  WEST 6 9 . 7 7  FEET ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY LINE TO THE PODT OF 
BEGINNING, TOGETHER WITH .4LL WATER, DITCH AND LATERAL RIGHTS THEREON, INCLUDING SHARZS OR 
PORTIONS OF SHARE IN THE NEW DRY CREEK DITCH COMPANY, REPRESENTING THE WATER USED ON SZ.1D 
LAND. 
EXCEPT DITCH AND ROAD RIGHTS OF WAY 
.ACND PROJECT NO. 52056.0. 
E.4GLE ROAD ( State Street to Floating Fearhzr Road ) 
RIGHT-OF-WAY PARCEL $ 4 9  
["a;.] 
O\VNERS: Sharon L. Sharp 
SEIIL! SE113 S.8, T.4N. R.IE., B.R.I. 
[.era\ Descrirxion fnr dd i t inna i  Prihlic Rich[-of-Wav 
.A parcel of land for Public iiibht-of-Way located in the Southeast Quaner of the 
Southeast Quaner of Section 8,  Township 4 North, R m g e  1 E a r ,  Boise Meridian, Ada 
Counry, Idaho, said parcel being more panicuiarly described as follows: 
Commencing at the southeast comer of said Section 8, thence North O000'00" East 
(formerly North), 827.20 feet along the east line of said Section 8 to a point; 
Thence South 90°00'00" West (formerly West), 22.00 feet to a point on the south bound- 
ary of Ailten's Second Addition ro Eagle, as filed in Book 4 at Page 150, records of .Ada 
Count)', Idaho, said point also being the RE.AL P O M T  O F  BEGINNING: 
Thence continuing South 90°00'00" West, 10.00 feet along the south boundary of said 
Aiken's Second Addition to a point, 
Thence South 76"2;'54" East, 72.26 feet to a point, said point l y i n ~  33.00 fezt at right 
angles to said east line of Section 8, 
Thence North O000'00" E a t  (formerly Nonh), 20.00 feet along a line parallel to the east 
line of said Section 8 to the R e d  Point of Beginning. 
Said Parcel contains 0.0023 .Acres or 100 Square Feet. more or less. 
Subject to easements of record or in use. 
Basis of Bearing: North 0'00'00" East (formerly NORTH) along the Section Line 
common to Sections 8 and 9, Township 4 North. Range 1 East, Boise Meridian. .4da 
County, Idaho. as shown on the official Plat for .Ailten's Second .Addition to Eagle . 
according io (he official plat thereof filed in Book 1 of  Plats at Paoe - 150. records of 
,Ada Counry, Idaho. 
. . 
' './ 
ACHD PROJECT NO. 52056.0, 
EAGLE ROAD ( State Street to Floating Feather Road ) 
RIGHT-OF-WAY PARCEL % 19A 
OUWERS: Sharon L. Sharp 
SE1I.I SEII4 S.8, T.4N, R.IE., B.M. 
Lena1 Description for Permanent Easement 
A parcel of land for a Permanent Easement located in the Southeast Quaner of 
the Southeast Quarter of Section 8, Township 3 Nonh, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, 
Ada Counry, ldaho, said parcel being more particularly described as foiloivs: 
Commencing at the southeast comer of said Section 8, thence Nonh O"00'00" East 
(formerly North), 667.1 1 feet aiong the east line of said Section 8 to a point; thence 
South 81"55'00n West, 33.33 feet to a point on the northerly bank of the Drainage Ditch 
and also lying on the westerly riglit-of-way line of North Eagle Road, said point being the 
REAL POINT OF BEGINNING: 
Thence continuing South 81 "55'00" West. 12.12 Feet along said northerly bank to a point. 
said point measuring 45.00 feet at right angles to the east line of said Section 8; 
Thence Nonh O"OOaOO" East (formerly Nonh), 166.49 feet along a line parallel to the east 
iine of said Secrion 8 to a point on the south boundary of Aiken's Second Addition 
to Eagie, as filed in Book 4 oFPlats at Page 150. records o f  Ada County. Stare of 
Idaho: 
Thence Nonh 90°00'00" East, 2.00 feet along said south boundary of Aiken's Second 
Addition to Eagie to a point: 
Thence South 26"33'54" East, 22.36 feet to a point lying 33.00 feet at right angles to said 
east line of Section 8, 
Thence South O"00'00" East (formerly South), 144.73 feet along a line parallel to the east 
line of said Section 8 to the Real Point of Beginning. 
Said Parcel contains 0.0433 Acres or I .SSS Square Feet, more or less 
Subject to easements of record or in use. 
Basis o f  B e x i n ~ :  Nonh O"O0'00" East (fonneriy NORTH) along the Section Line 
common to Sections S and 9: Township 4 Nonh.Range I East. Boise Meridian. Ada 
Counry. Idaho, as shown on the official Plat ibr Aiken's Second Addition to Eagle. 
according to the official plat thereof. filed in Book 4 of Plats at Page 150, records of 
.Ada County, Idaho. 
u003.l. 
ACHD PROJECT NO. 52056,01 
E.4GLE ROAD ( State Street to Floating Feathr; Road ) 
RIGHT-OF-WAY PARCEL $ 4 9 8  
OWNERS: Sharon L. Sharp 
SEllJ SE114 S.8, T.4N, R.IE.. B.bI. 
Leeal Description for Permanent Fasement 
A parcel of land for a Permanent Easement located in the Southeast Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 8, Township 4 North, Range I East, Boise Meridian, Ada 
County, Idaho, said parcel being more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at the southeast comer of said Section 8, thence North O"00'00" East 
(formerly N o h ) ,  567.20 feet along the east line of said Section 8 to a point; thence 
South 88'38'31" West, 33.01 feet to a point on the westerly right-of-way line ofNorth 
Eagle Road, said point aiso being the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING; 
Thence North O"00'00" East (formerly North), 69.77 feet along said right-of-way line to 
a point on the southerly boundary the Drainage Ditch; 
Thence South 70e00'00" West, 18.09 feet along said southerly boundary of the Drainage 
Ditch to a point measuring 50.00 feet at right angles to the east line of Section 8; 
Thence South 62"29'58" East. 12.40 feet to a point measuring 33.00 feet at right angles 
to the east line of said Section 8; 
Thence Sourh O000'00" East. 58.00 fe:t along a line parallel to said east line of Section S 
to a point; 
Thence Nonh 88"38'3 I "  East, 6.00 feet to the Real Point of Beginning. 
Said Parcel contains 0.0107 Acres or 166 Square Feet, more or less 
Subject to easements of record or in use. 
Basis of Bearing: North O"00'00" East (formerly NORTH) along the Section Line 
common io Sections S and 9. Township 4 Noch. Range 1 East. Boise Meridian. Ada 
County, Idaho. as shown on the official Plat for .4ikenVs Second Addition to Eagle. 
according to the official plat thereof. filed in Book 4 of Plats a! Page 150. records of 
.Ada County, Idaho. . -. . 
: ,. - .. . -. 
ORDER OF CONDEMNATTON 
Project No. ACHD 52056.0 
Right-of-way Parcel No. 49 
Highway -North Eagle Road 
Location - Eagle Road Bypass north to West State Street 
Eagle City, Ada County, State of Idaho 
The Ada County Highway District Board of Commissioners have, in a regular scheduled 
meeting, considered the report and recomniendations ofthe Ada County Highway District's Staff, and 
having duly considered the matter, finds: 
1. That the above designated project is for a public use authorized by law, to-wit 
(specifL): ACHD Proiect No. 52056.0 -North Eaele Road. Eacle Bvpass north to State Street. 
2 .  That the right-of-way necessary for the proposed project coilsists of a parcel of real 
property located in Ada County, Idaho, more particularly described in Exhibit "A", attached hereto, 
and by this reference made a part hereof as if set out in full herein. 
3. That the parcel of  real property described herein is necessary to the construction and 
completion of said project, and that the construction of said project cannot be performed without the 
acquisition of said parcei. 
4. That the owners, or reputed owners and claimants of said parcel of real property 
known to the Highway District at this time, based upon the Commitment for Title Insurance now. on 
file with the Ada County Highway District, are as follows, to-wit: 
Sharon L. Sharp P.O. Box 38, Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Owner of Record Property Address: 127 Eagle Road, Eagle, Idaho 83616 
5 That the Ada County Highway District, by and through its agents, employees, and 
representatives, has sought in good faith to purchase the land sought to be taken, or to settle with the 
owners, or reputed owners, for the damages which might resuit to their property from said taking, and 
have been unable to make any reasonable bargain therefore, or settlement of such damages. 
6. That the location of the land sought to be taken by the Highway District is most 
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury, and that Ada County Highway 
District has the power of Eminent Domain. 
7. That all rights of access to, From, and between the right-of-way of  the public way and 
all of the contiguous remaining real property ofthe above named owners, or reputed owners, shall be 
extinguished and prohibited except for access, if any, in the project hereinabove described. 
ORDER OF CONDEMNAT' 
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RECOMMENDED FOR APPROVAL: 
By: By: 4. fliL.,--A 
u~eny&f~yman ,  ~ i & t o r  
Chief of Right-of-way 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that the 
acquisition of the land and property rights hereinabove described is necessary to the construction and 
maintenance of the said Highway Project hereinabove described. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that The Ada County Highway District shall acquire the 
hereinabove described real property and property rights through the power of Eminent Domain. 
Dated this (qW. day of 9- , 1997. 
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
ATTEST: By: 
/ Susan S. gastlake, President 
89 74 s s + - 7 ~ ~  
. Nyman, B~rector 
Ada County Highway District 
[Site) 

EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW & MCKLVEEN, 
CHARTERED 
ATTORNEYS &No COUNSELORS A7 LAW 
CAPITOL PARK PLAZA TELLPHONE 
(208) 344-8535 
300 NORTH SIXTH STREET 
POST OFT1CE BOX 1368 FACSIMILE 
(208) 344.es42 
8015C.  IDAHO 83701 
JAMES L. B E ~ L I N  
Or COUNSEL 
CERTIFIED MAIL AND 
REGULAR POST 
Sharon L. Sharp 
P.O. Box 38 
127 North Eagle Road 
Eagle, ldaho 8361 6 
February 25, 1997 
__Z 
RE: ACHD Project No. 52056.0 - North Eagle Road, Eagle Bypass North to 
State Street 
Right-o f- Wa y Parcel No. 49 
Dear Ms. Sharp: 
We represent the legal interests of the Ada County Highway District ("ACHD"), 
and in this capacity it has employed us to pursue condemnation of a portion of ' 
property owned by you that is generally located at 127 North Eagle Road, Eagle, ldaho 
8361 6, and more particularly described on Exhibits A, 8, C and D attached hereto (the 
"Property "). 
The ACHD Board of Commissioners on February 19, 1997, entered an order of 
condemnation instructing the ACHD to proceed forward with the condemnation action 
on the Property. Thus, as a precursor to such condemnation proceeding, and i n  an 
effort to resolve this matter, I am writing to you. 
It is our understanding that an initial offer was made to you in the sum of 
$14,780.00, which is the appraised price based upon an appraisal performed by 
Ambrose Appraisal Company. Subsequently, further negotiations were had, and 
ACHD made a settlement offer on January 21,1997, in the sum of $16,258.00. This 
offer was calculated as follows: 
Public Right-of-way: 100 ~ q .  ft. x $7.00 per sq. ft. = $700 
Permanent easement: 1,888 sq. ft. x $7.00 per sq.ft. x 75% = $9,912 
466 sq. ft. x $8.75 per sq. ft. x 75% = $3,058 
Value of improvements taken $1,110 
Administrative Settlement $1.478 
TOTAL $16,258 
Sharon L. Sharp 
February 25, 1997 
Page 2 
It is our further understanding that ACHD agreed t o  several requests made b y  
you, which are as follows: 
A. Temporary fencing will be erected t o  protect your cats during the 
construction proje,ct; 
B. Your ingress and egress on Eagle Road will remain the same; 
C. You may choose your landscape company for pruning your trees that  
border the Property, and ACHD wil l  pay for this service; and 
D. ACHD wil l  install three-sided boxes around the mature trees bordering 
the Property in order to  protect them. (This does no t  include the  tree on 
the south side of the canal which needs t o  be removed.) 
I t  is my understanding that you have rejected this last proposal, b u t  that  you 
have not communicated an alternative settlement price. 
Therefore, ACHD has authorized me t o  extend a final settlement of fer  t o  you  
in the sum of $76,258, wi th ACHD agreeing t o  comply w i th  the items specified 
above, which settlement sum shall be paid upon execution and delivery o f  a warranty 
deed and permanent easement in favor of ACHD. 
This offer is open up .through and including March 3, 1997, at  5:00 p.m., 
Mountain Standard Time, at which time it shall be deemed terminated and withdrawn. 
In the eventthe offer is no t  accepted, ACHD wi l l  pursue condemnation of the  Property 
based- upon' the appraised price of $14,780, and I will file a complaint for 
condemnation wi th  the  Ada County Clerk o f  the  Court  on Tuesday, March 4, 1997. 
Please feel free t o  contact me if you have any questions or concerns, or desire 
to  discuss the settlement proposal. 
KDGIslp 




E DON COPPLE 
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Telecopier: (208) 386-9428 
ISB Nos. 1085 and 5480 
Attorneys for: Sharon L. Sharp 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, ) Supreme Court No. 26237 
a body politic corporate of the 1 D. C. No. CV OC 9701 148D 
State of Idaho, 1 
1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S 
) PETITION FOR REVIEW 
VS. 
1 
SHARON L. SHARP, 1 
1 
Defendant- Appellant, ) 
DefendantiAppellant, by and through her attorneys, Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, 
submits this brief in support of her petition for review of the Idaho Court of Appeals Opinion filed 
April 17,2001 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW - 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15 
A. The Court of Aooeals has ruled that in a direct condemnation action in the State of Idaho 
the trial Court determines what is taken for vublic ourposes, rather than the condemnor . . . . . . . . .  15 
B. The Court of Aoaeals' decision also has broad ramifications for everv property owner in 
-ate of ldaho..as all pri\are propem is ~ b k c t  to the oov,er of eminent domain and 
. . . . . . .  L C o u r t  of Apncals' decision has an effect on even. condemnation cnscfiled henceforth 18 
C. The Court of Aopeals cites only one case in su~oort of its vosition, State v. Rueth. which 
actuallv cites to cases which suaoort Appellants position in this aooeal which the Court 
of Aooeals reiected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19 
D. ?'he Court of A~peals has dec&ed to folloy or even discuss and reiect the body of case 
la\\. from other iurisdictions which is directly ongoint on this issue. dismisj- 
decisions from other iurisdictions with a oassine comment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26 
E. The Court of A P D ~ ~ ~ s  has is ued a decision on a substantive leral issue off& 
imoression not heretofore determined bv the Supreme Court; which will h a v m  
imolications for everv eovernmental arency and utilitv in Idaho that has been 
authorized to condemn real orooerty for public oumoses. as well as everv ow= 
of orivate orovertv who will face condemnation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28 
F. The Court of Aopeals has aoolied the Supreme Court's decision in Rueth v. 
State. which was an inverse condemnation case, to the facts of a direct condemnation 
case. which reoresents an extension of the Suvreme Court's holding in R u e t h j  
has never been endorsed bv the Supreme Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29 
G .  The Court of Apoeals Did Not Address the Critical Issue Presented on AooeaJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32 
H. The Court of Avoeals decision contains statements which are not 
based on anv information in the record and which does not accuratelv reflec- 
facts of what transoired in this case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVlEW - 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As the Court of Appeals decisions did not correctly set forth all of therelevant facts presented 
on appeal, a brief Statement of the Case is presented here for the Court's information. Legal 
argument and authority in support of the Petition for Review follows. 
On February 19, 1997, the Ada County Highway District (hereinafter "ACHD"), entered an 
official Order of Condemnation relating to the property owned by Sharon Sharp (hereinafter 
"Sharp"). The Order specified the property rights to be acquired, including the following: 
7.  That all rights of access to, from, and between the right-of-way of the public way and all 
of the contiguous remaining real property of the named owners, or reputed owners, shall be 
extinguished and prohibited except for access, if any, in the project hereinabove described.' 
The Order of Condemnation was signed by the ACHD Commissioners and was attached to the 
Complaint for condemnation, filed March 6,  1997, as Exhibit B.' A copy of the Order is attached 
hereto as Appendix A. 
This case is about the ACHD's refusal to accept responsibility for the consequences of its 
Order of Condemnation. ACHD has sought to escape the plain and unambiguous language of its 
Order in order to avoid paying damages to Sharp, and induced the trial court into deciding issues not 
properly before it. 
ACHD elected to undertake a public project to widen the portion of Eagle Road between the 
' R., Vol. 1, p. 13. 
* R., Vol. 1, pgs. 13-14. 
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Eagle Bypass and State Street in Eagle, Idaho. Sharp owns three contiguous lots on the corner of 
Eagle Road and Aikens street3 A copy of the most recent record of survey for the Sharp property 
is attached hereto as Appendix B. Currently there are three residential homes on the Sharp lots. Two 
of the lots have fiontage on Eagle Road and residential access driveways onto Eagle; the third has 
access off of Aikens. An aerial photograph of the property in the before take condition is attached 
hereto as Appendix C.4 A drawing depicting the residential use of the Sharp property is attached 
hereto as Appendix D.' 
It is undisputed that the highest and best use of Sharp's property is commercial, not 
residential, and that the existing residential access points onto Eagle could not serve commercial 
de~elopment.~ Likely all three lots would be developed together as one commercial de~elopment.~ 
A drawing illustrating the highest and best use of the Sharp property as of the date of taking, in the 
before take condition, is attached hereto as Appendix E.* A drawing illustrating the highest and best 
3 Exhibit 27 to the Record, Affidavit of Mark Richey in Support of Defendart's Second Motion to Allow 
Severance Damages at Trial, Filed June 25, 1999, Record of Survey attached to appraisal report. 
4 Admitted as Court Trial Exhibit 103 
5 Admitted as Court Trial Exhibit 101. 
6 TI., Vol. I, p. 966,L. 11-22; TI., Vol. I, p. 1047, L. 10-14; TI., Vol. I, p. 1108, L. 22 through p. 1109, 
L. 3. 
7 Exhibit 34 to the Record, Defendant's Offer of Proof Regarding Severance Damage, Exhibit A thereto, 
Affidavit ofChris Korte to Accompany Defendant's Offer of Proof, p. 5. 
Admitted as Court Trial Exhibit 123. 
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use of the Sharp property as of the date of taking, in the after take contiition, is attached hereto as 
Appendix F? 
Despite the fact that ACHD recognized the highest and best use of Sharp's property was for 
commercial use, ACHD prepared plans for the widening project which pxovided Sharp with only her 
current residential access driveways onto Eagle Road rather than providing access suitable for 
commercial use of the property." 
During right-of-way acquisition negotiations, Sharp made clear her concern regarding the fact 
that ACHD was taking her access rights to and from Eagle Road, which would devalue her property. 
This concern was memorialized in an ACHD internal memo from Right of Way Agent Dick Brown. 
Mr. Brown listed Ms. Sharp's concerns in the memo along with ACHD's responses to those 
concerns. The relevant portions of the January 24,1997 Brown Memo provided: 
6. She wants some access to Eagle, other than the one presently in existence on the comer 
of Aikens and Eagle Road 
6. Answer - She may have the access to Eagle Road as it now exists. Once the property 
sells, this access will be taken away. Franz Witte said that it was her choice. The property 
was valued at its present condition. I said I would ask if she could have another access to 
Eagle Road, other than the access now on the corner." 
Admitted as Court Trial Exhibit 124. 
10 Court Trial Exhibits 149 & 150 are ACHD's Final Construction Plans for the area of Sharp's property. 
11 Court Trial Exhibit 125; Exhibit 34 to the Record, Defendant's Offer of Proof Regarding Severance 
Damage to the Remainder, Filed December 13,1999 (See specifically Exhibit B of the Offer of Proof, Affidavit of 
Patrick Dobie, Exhibit D to that Affidavit is the Dick Brown Memo.) 
BNEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW - 5 
A copy of the Brown Memo is attached hereto as Appendix G. 
Ms. Sharp was repeatedly advised that she could only have the existing residential access to 
and from Eagle Road after the taking, and no other access.'' ACHD offered Sharp $16,258.00 for 
the taking of her property and property rights for its project.'3 When ACHD was not able to reach 
an agreement with Sharp, it entered its Order of Condemnation defining the property rights to be 
acquired and filed suit to take the same via condemnation. 
Sharp retained several experts to determine the value of her property both before and after 
the taking and to assess just compensation. Mark Richey, a certified MA1 appraiser, determined that 
the loss of commercial access rights to and 60m Eagle road substantially impacted the value of her 
property and determined that just compensation due was $440,000.'4 Roger Wood, a commercial 
real estate broker, reached the same conclusion regarding the impact of the taking and concluded just 
compensation was $390,000 in his opinion." Ron McConnell, arealtor with JensenReal Estate, also 
determined that the loss of access rights impaired the value and marketability of Sharp's property, 
I2 Exhibit 41 to the Record, Affidavit of Sharon L. Sharp in Support of Defendant's Motion for Attorneys 
Fees and Costs, Filed January 11,2000, p. 2. 
l 3  Exhibit 41 to the Record, Affidavit of Sharon L. Sharp in Support of Defendant's Motion for Attorneys 
Fees and Costs, Filed January 11,2000, p. 4. 
14 Exhibit 34 lo the Record, Defendant's Offer of Proof Regarding Severance Damage to the Remainder, 
Filed December 13, 1999, Exhibit C thereto, Affidavit of Mark W. Richey, p. 3. 
l5 Exhibit 34 to the Record, Defendant's Offer of Proof Regarding Severance Damage to the Remainder, 
Filed December 13, 1999, Exhibit F thereto, Affidavit of Roger W. Wood, p. 6. 
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and estimated just compensation to be $456,733.16 Art Berry, a business appraiser with experience 
buying and selling commercial real estate, also concluded the loss of access rights damages the 
property's value and assessed just compensation at $447,000.17 
In addition to the Order of Condemnation, there was a second reason Sharp's experts 
believed full commercial access to Eagle Road was taken by the project. The experts had considered 
the installation of a traffic light at the intersection of Plaza Street and Eagle Road. Pat Dobie, a 
traffic engineer retained by Sharp, believed, based on ACHD documents and plans, that Plaza Street 
andthe traffic signal were part of the Eagle Road widening project. Since Eagle Road is functionally 
classified as a Minor Arterial road and ACHD policy does not allow full access driveways within 
440' of a signalized intersection on that type of road, the Sharp property would not qualify for access 
to and from Eagle Road after the project. 
ACHD then took the position that the traffic signal and pima Street were not part of the 
project and therefore could not be considered in assessing damages to Sharp's property, and further, 
that ACHD would treat Eagle Road as a Collector rather than as a Minor Arterial if access was 
requested. ACHD claimed that the dispute on these factual issues was one that needed to be resolved 
by the trial court, and therefore the jury trial was vacated and a Court Trial was set to commence. 
The Court Trial was held to determine the classification of Eagle Road and whether Plaza 
16 
Exhibit 34 to the Record, Defendant's Offer of Proof Regarding Severance Damage to the Remainder, 
Filed December 13, 1999, Exhibit D thereto, Affidavit of Ron McConnell, Exhibit C to McConnell's Affidavit. 
17 Exhibit 34 to the Record, Defendant's Offer of Proof Regarding Severance Damage to the Remainder, 
Filed December 13, 1999, Exhibit E thereto, Affidavit of Arthur J. Beny, p. 6. 
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Street and the signal were or were not part of the project. The trial was n> to address whether any 
damage to Sharp's property had occurred from any source. Sharp set forth the issues in her pretrial 
brief to the Court: 
It is the Defendant's understanding from the previous pretrial conferences that the only issues 
UDOn which the Court is to receive evidence and make a factual determination are: 
A. Is the relevant section of Eagle Road classified as a collector or a minor 
arterial? 
B. What is the ACHD project? 
1. Is Plaza Street and/or the Eagle RoadIPlaza intersection part of the 
ACHD project? 
2. Is the signalization of Plaza Street part of the ACHD project?" 
ACHD's Pretrial Memorandum contained a broader statement of the issues because ACHD 
included items which had already been stipulated to (such as whether ACHD had a right of eminent 
domain) and a variety of miscellaneous issues, as well as those enumerated by Sharp." However, 
the issues were stripped down to the same two issues Defendant Sharp set forth in her Pretrial 
Memorandum by the time the Court Trial Commenced. Mr. Jones, representing ACHD, defined the 
scope of the trial in his opening statement as follows: 
I submit that the thrust of the matter today pertains to two separate issues. One is a 
question with respect to a potential signal light at the comer of Eagle Road and Plaza Street, 
and whether that signal light is or is not part of the construction project that more generally 
runs from north of State Street down to the comer of Eagle Road and Plaza Street. 
And the second issue that we intend to address today directly is the question of the 
status of Eagle Road. There's a dispute between the parties as to the matter of Eagle Road. 
There's a dispute between the parties as to the matter of Eagle Road as to whether it's a 
18 Exhibit 14 to the Record, Defendant's Pretrial Memorandum For Court Trial, pg. 2. 
'' Exhibit 13 to the Record, Plaintiffs Pretrial Memorandum For Court Trial, pgs. 1-2 
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collector street or an arterial, and depending upon the factual resolution the Court then may 
have legal issues pertaining to the affect of that designation or that fact finding on the right 
of access of the Sharp propeicy to Eagle Road." 
It is significant to note that although Sharp had two wholly independent bases for her claim 
that she had lost commercial access rights to and from Eagle Road (the Order of Condemnation and 
the traffic signal), ACHD chose to offer no testimony at all on the Order of Condemnation or its 
meaning or construction. The Order was admitted at the court trial as Exhibit 160 without objection 
from ACHD?' 
Larry Sale, head of Development Services at ACHD, testified at the Court Trial on cross- 
examination as follows: 
"Q: Mr. Sale, have you had a chance to read paragraph 7 of Exhibit 160?" 
"A: I have." 
"Q: And doesn't this portion of the order of condemnation extinguish all access of Sheni 
Sharp's property other than the access depicted on the project plans that we have been 
discussing?" 
"A: Your Honor, that may be what that sentence means. I prefer not to interpret it.'"2 
Throughout the course of the trial, no further evidence was offered regarding the meaning 
of the Order of Condemnation. In closing argument, ACHD failed to mention the Order or its effect 
in any way.23 Sharp's closing focused heavily on the Order and its clear and precise language which 
20 Tr., P. 25, Lns. 7-22. 
21 Tr,  p. 326, Lns. 16-25 
22 Tr., p. 327, Lns. 17-25. 
23 Tr., p. 594, L. 7 through p. 6 17, L. 17. 
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explicitly took all access rights to and from Eagle Road other than existing residential access.24 It 
was clearly established during the court trial that the existing residential access driveways could not 
serve or accommodate commercial use of the Sharp property; the effect of the Order was therefore 
undeniably to leave Sharp with no access rights to Eagle Road for commercial purposes. 
In rebuttal argument, Mr. Jones addressed the Order of Condemnation issue for the first time. 
As ACHD had introduced no evidence relating to the Order of Condemnation, the only mention of 
the Order or its meaning came in rebuttal argument from Mr. Jones, which is quoted in its entirety 
as follows: 
With respect to the order of condemnation I really find it fascinating that if the 
defendant really thought that was the end all to all this why we didn't see a motion for 
summary judgment. If purely legal question, no factual issue, and so plain on its face and 
all of this, I think defendants are grasping at straws and twisting in the wind on it. They have 
quoted one or two lines from the order of condemnation. All that order of condemnation 
says is that all rights of access to and from the property are taken except for access if any in 
the project here and above described. And the project here and above described gave them 
the same access they already have. Doesn't say residential access. The drawing and plans 
and project documents don't show any different access. 
Also defense conveniently overlooked the fact that the complaint which sought to 
condemn property doesn't take any access. It simply provides for the taking of a portion on 
the corner, the hundred square feet and the slope easement. And makes no reference to 
condemning any access. And I submit that all that statement in the order of condemnation 
says it's a form provision that access is going to be taken and that all access is taken except 
what is in the plan. The plans gave them the same access they have had before the plans 
were drawn. And as to any future access it would depend on whatever the rules and 
regulations are. And Like I say, complaint certainly doesn't seek to condemn any access.25 
24 Tr., p. 617, L. 19 through p. 660, L. 12 
25 Tr., p. 660, L. 16 through p. 661, L. 20. 
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The trial court found in its oral ruling from the bench26 and in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered on September 18, 1998 that the Order of Condemnation was not 
relevant in determining whether access had been taken.z7 
29.The February 29,1997, order of condemnation (exhibit 160) is not material to the access 
issue. [Finding of FactlZ8 
H. The February 29,1997, order ifcondemnation (Exhibit 160) is not material to access issue 
at all and when read in context and its entirety, simply defines the access that is available to 
the Sharp property exactly as it exists, namely that the Sharp property has two residential 
access points that currently exists, plus it has the right to apply upon commercial 
development for commercial access points. [Conclusion of LawIz9 
ACHD submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which also invited the Court to 
rule as a matter of law that there was no severance damage to the Sharp property caused by the 
taking.)' Sharp objected to the proposed findings and conclusions since no valuation testimony, 
which would address the presence or absence of severance damage, had been offered by either side 
at trial.)' Despite this, the trial court entered a finding of fact and a conclusion of law that there was 
no severance: 
26 Tr. P. 672, L. 25 through p. 673, L. 18, 
28 R., Vol. I, pg. 102 
29 R., Vol. I., pg. 106 
30 Exhibit 17 to the Record, Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Received 
August 7, 1999, p. 12. 
R., Val. I, pgs. 89-90. 
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42. The Sharp property has incurred no severance damages as a result of the ~ a k e . ~ '  
I. The Sharp property has incurred no severance damages as a result of the Take.33 
At that point in the litigation, Sharp had incurred $52,375.78 in costs34 to assess just 
compensation based on ACHD's representations35 that access other than existing residential access 
was being taken as part of the ~ondemnation.~~ In addition, substantial attorney time had been 
consumed, with $69,143.95 in time invested in the case.37 The trial court found that the traffic light 
and Plaza Street were not part of the ACHD pr~ject '~  and that the classification of Eagle Road as an 
Arterial or Collector was irrelevant. The Court had also found the Order of Condemnation to be 
irrelevant to the access issue.39 Therefore, Sharp could not introduce evidence at the jury trial that 
she had lost her commercial access rights to Eagle Road, devaluing her property. Since, at ACHD's 
32 R., Vol. I, p. 104 
33 R., Vol. I, p. 106. 
34 Exhibit 43 to the Record, Affidavit of Heather A. Cunningham in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Costs and Fees, Filed Janualy 11,2000, pgs. 5-6. 
35 Exhibit 41 to the Record, Affidavit of Sharon L. Sharp in Support of Defendant's Motion for Attorneys 
Fees and Costs, Filed January 11,2000, p. 5. 
j6 Exhibit 41 to the Record, Affidavit of Sharon L. Sharp in Support of Defmdant's Motion For Attorneys 
Fees & Costs, Filed January 11,2000, pg. 4. 
37 Exhibit 43 to the Record, Affidavit of Heather A. Cunningham in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Costs and Attorneys Fees, pg. 4, 
R., Vo1. I, p. 102, NO. 33. 
39 R., Vol. I., p. 102, No. 28. 
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urging, the trial court had also ruled that there was no severance damage to the Sharp property from 
any source, Sharp and ACHD were left with only the task of assessing the value to be paid for the 
taking of an easement, some trees, and a portion of the Sharp property in fee simple. 
Sharp then pursued an interlocutory appeal to this Court, which was reje~ted.~' Sharp filed 
a Motion for Reconsideration4' and presented the trial court with substantial legal authority from 
other jurisdictions holding that orders of condemnation define the rights acquired by the condemnor 
and the condemnor must pay for those rights."' Despite the fact that ACHD produced no legal 
authority to the the trial court, after hearing argun~ent,44 denied the Motion for 
Reconsideration4' and scheduled a jury trial. 
At the jury trial, ACHD appraiser David Ambrose testified that just compensation was 
$17,62346 and ACHD appraiser Joe Corlett testified that in his opinion just compensation was 
40 R., VOI. I, p. 108 
41 R., Vol. I, pgs. 122-124. 
42 Exhibit 20 to the Record, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law Entered on September 18, 1998. 
43 Exhibit 21 to the Record, Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Filed January 13,1999. 
44 Oral argument on the Motion for Reconsideration, Tr., p. 688, L. 1 tkoughp. 715, L. 14 
45 R., Vol. I, pgs. 129-130 
46 Tr., p. 1155, Lns. 3-6. 
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$9,005.47.47 Sharp, precluded from introducing any evidence of severance damage from any source, 
offered testimony from appraiser Mark Richey that the value of the taking and just compensation was 
$19,155.~~ ACHD advocated $9,005 as just compen~ation~~ and argued that its own appraiser, 
Ambrose, was inc~rrect.'~ The jury returned a verdict of $16,507.00.51 
Sharp then sought costs and fees, as the jury verdict was closer to Sharp's figure than to that 
advocated by ACHD, and as she had incurred costs and fees in reliance upon ACHD's 
representations that access rights were being condemned. The trial court awarded no costs and fees 
to Sharp and noted "1 view the whole case, frankly, and in fairness, as a waste of time."52 
The issues on appeal are very narrow and are questions of first impression in Idaho. Note 
that Sharp is not appealing any issues relating to the classification of Eagle Road or the installation 
of a traffic light at the Plaza StreetiEagle Road intersection. 
47 Tr., p. 1073, Lns. 14-22. 
48 Tr., p. 1001, Lns. 19-25 
49 Tr., p. 1205, Lns. 4-25. 
Tr., VoI. t, p. 1200, L. 24 through p. 1205, L. 3. 
'' R., Vol. I, p. 176. 
92 Tr., p. 1298, Lns. 23-24. 
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ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITlON FOR REVIEW 
A. The Court of Appeals has ruled that in a direct condemnation actionin the State of Idaho the trial 
court determines what is taken for public purposes. rather than the condemnor 
Condemning authorities have been entrusted by the Idaho Legislature with the power of 
eminent domain. These condemnors have also been charged with the responsibility to ascertain what 
is needed for public use, as both necessity and public use are prerequisites to a taking by the exercise 
of the eminent domain power. 
The result of the Court of Appeals decision is that trial courts will be placed in the position 
of deciding what property and property rights are to be acquired by condemnors, rather than having 
the condemning authorities decide what rights they need to acquire. The decision regarding what 
will be taken is removed from the condemnor, and then the condemning agencies will be required 
under the Idaho Constitution, Section I, Article 14, and the Idaho Statutes, I.C. jj 7-71 1, to pay for 
the rights the trial court has determined it must acquire. This flies in the face of the majority of cases 
from other jurisdictions to consider this issue. (In fact, Appellant is aware of no case in any 
jurisdiction which supports the position taken by the Idaho Court of Appeals in this regard). 
The power to determine the taking is a power of the sovereign, not the trial court. As the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina stated in City of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnuis, CO., 25 1 
N.C. 531,533,112 S.E.2d 111 (1960): 
The power of eminent domain, that is, the right to take private property for public 
use, is inherent in sovereignty. Our Constitution, art. I, sec. 17, requires payment of 
fair compensation for the property so taken. This is the only limitation imposed on 
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sovereignty with respect to taking. 
The taking must, of course, be for a public purpose, but the sovereign determines the 
nature and extent of the property required for that purpose. It may take for a limited 
period of time or in perpetuity. It may take and easement, a mere limited use, leaving 
the owner with the right to use in any manner he may desire so long as such use does 
not interfere with the use by the sovereign for the purpose for which it takes, or it 
may take an absolute, unqualified fee, terminating all of defendant's property rights 
in the land taken. [Citations omitted] 
The general rule is that courts may review the condemnor's definition of what property and 
property rights are being acquired only where there has been gross abuse or manifest fraud on the 
part of the condemnor. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia noted in its decision in Virginia 
Electric and Power Co. v. Webb, 196 Va. 555,84 S.E.2d 735,740 (1954): 
'The grantee of the power of eminent domain may ordinarily exercise a large discretion not 
only in respect of the particular property, but also as to the amount of land to be taken for the 
public purpose. This discretion is not reviewable by the courts, unless, possibly, where there 
has been a gross abuse or manifest fraud.' * * * ' 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, $109, p. 
736. Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57,40 S.Ct. 62,64 L.ed. 135. 
'It is competent for the courts to supervise the exercise of the power delegated, but they 
cannot invade the bounds set by the Legislature; and will not undertake to control the 
discretion of the companies in taking property for their own use, unless there has been a very 
clear abuse of power. * * *' Zircle v. Southern Ry. Co., 102 Va. 17,20,45 S.E. 802, State 
v. Horner, 121 W.Va. 75, 1 S.E.(2d)486. 
'Unless the discretion of the condemning agency as to reasonable necessity is wrongfully, 
arbitrarily, or oppressively exercised, that discretion cannot be controlled or reviewed by the 
court. * * *' Johnson v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 187 Md. 454,463, 
50 A.(2d) 918. 
The same rule was well articulated by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Atkinson v. Carolina 
Power & Light, Co., 239 S.C. 150, 121 S.E.2d 743,746 (1961): 
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By Section 24-12 of the 1952 Code of Laws the Legislature of South Carolina has 
expressly delegated to the defendant company, and all others sinlilarly engaged, the 
power of eminent domain. In the exercise of that power those to whom it has been 
delegated represent the sovereignty of the state, and are empowered to decide, subject 
only to supervision of the courts to avoid fraudulent or capricious abuse, what and 
how much land of the citizens they will condemn for their purposes. As stated by the 
Court in the case of Boofiart v. Central Electric Power Company Cooperative, 222 
S.C. 289,72 S.E.2d 576,578, quoting from 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain 3 89, p. 882: 
'The legislature may delegate the power of determining the necessity of 
exercising the power of eminent domain to public officers or boards or to 
private corporations vested with the power of eminent domain, and in the 
absence of any statutory provision submitting the matter to a court or jury the 
decision of the question of necessity lies with the body of individuals to 
whom the state has delegated the authority to take. Generally, a 
determination by the grantee of the power is conclusive and is not subject to 
judicial review, in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or clear abuse of discretion. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has taken a rule developed in inverse condemnation cases and 
applied it in direct takings cases, ruling that the trial court decides all issues except just 
compensation, includingthe issue ofwhatproperty andproperty rights are beingacquired. The rule 
in other states is that the condemnor defines the taking and this definition is not disturbed by the trial 
court. If an issue of interpretation arises due to an ambiguity in the definition of the taking, the 
Courts may determine that issue as a matter of law, not a matter of fact. As a result of the Court of 
Appeals decision, trial courts in Idaho will be called upon to define the taking as amatter of fact, and 
the sovereign power the legislature gave to the condemnor will be infringed. 
An additional result is that litigation expenses will increase for both sides in condemnation 
actions and the court system will endure additional burdens. It will become necessary to have either 
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a hearing or a court trial in each condemnation case in order to determine the property and property 
rights to be acquired ("the take"). Prior to the Court of Appeals decision, the take was determined 
by the condemning authority and set forth in resolutions or orders of condemnation. The Court of 
Appeals has ruled that official resolutions and orders entered by condemning authorities which 
purport to define the taking in fact do not do so, and it is the role of the trial court to determine the 
taking. The result is an open invitation to property owners to dispute, or at the very least insist on 
defining, the taking in every case. This will consume additional costs and judicial resources. It 
would be unreasonable to expect property owners facing condemnation to incur substantial costs and 
attorneys fees assessing just compensation due to them before the property and property rights to be 
acquired have been defined with certainty, which, after the Court of Appeals decision, can only he 
done by the trial court after evidence is presented. 
B. The Court of Avveals' decision also has broad ramifications for evervvrovertv owner in the State 
of Idaho. as all private provemi is subiect to the power ofeminent domain and the Court of Awpeals' 
decision has an effect on every condemnation case filed henceforth. 
Every property owner who negotiates with the condemnor and sells their property and 
property rights to the government without the necessity of a condemnation complaint being filed will 
be effected by the Court of Appeals decision. The Court of Appeals has basically accepted the Ada 
County Highway District's (ACHD) position in this case that the official Order of Condemnation 
entered by the ACHD and signed by the ACHD Commissioners, which defined explicitly the 
property and property rights to be acquired, is mere meaningless form language. 
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In condemnation actions where a lawsuit is filed, the condemnee may seek to have the trial 
court determine the taking as the Court of Appeals has empowered it to do in its decision. Therefore 
the property owner will have an opportunity to have the taking defined if he or she is sued. 
However, all of the property owners who settle their cases short of a condemnation proceeding will 
be relying on Orders of Condemnation which define the property and property rights taken. In light 
of the Court of Appeals decision that the language of the Order of Condemnation is not binding, 
property owners will be selling property rights to condemnors without any protected reliance upon 
the Order of Condemnation. 
C. The Court of Ao~eals cites only one case in support of its position, Ruetk v. State, which actually 
cites to cases which support Aopellants position in this appeal which the Court of Appeals reiected 
The Court of Appeals has cited Ruetk v. State, 100 Idaho 203,596 P.2d 75 (1978) to support 
its position, noting and relying upon the fact that the Ruetk decision cited approvingly a portion of 
a Kansas case, Brockv. State Highway Commission, 404 P.2d 934 (Kan. I 965). The Brockcase, like 
the Ruetk case, was an inverse condemnation action, not a direct condemnation action like the 
present case. 
The Brock decision actually cites approvingly to a 1964 Kansas decision, Roberts v. Upper 
Verdigris Watershed Joint District No. 24, 392 P.2d 914, 193 Kan. 151 (1964). The Roberts 
decision is a direct condemnation case and supports the position Appellant Sharp argued and briefed 
to the Court of Appeals and was cited in the Appellant's brief as supporting authority. In addition, 
three subsequent Kansas decisions, all of which were direct condemnation cases, support Appellant 
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Sharp's position and were cited in the Appellant's Brief but not discussed by the Court of Appeals: 
Application of City of Great Bend, Kansas, 869 P.2d 587,254 Kan. 699 (1994); Barcus v. City of 
Kansas City, 661 P.2d 806,s Kan.App.2d 506 (1983); Hudson v. City of Shawnee, 246 Kan. 395, 
790 P.2d 933 (1990). 
In Barcus v. City of Kansas City, 661 P.2d 806, 8 Kan.App.2d 506 (1983), the Court of 
Appeals of Kansas discussed at length the same issue presented on appeal in this case. The Kansas 
court defined the issue as follows: 
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in allowing defendant City of 
Kansas City to present evidence of damages based on a lesser use by the City of the 
easements acquired than that described in the appraiser's report and the petition of 
condemnation. Barcus. 661 P.2d at 807. 
In the Barcus case, the condemnation petition did not expressly reserve access rights to the property 
owner and the project plans showed some physical access to the remaining property, though no legal 
rights of access were reserved to the owner. In this case, ACHD's project plans showed two 
residential access driveways physically located on the remaining property, and the Order of 
Condemnation expressly extinguished all rights of access other than those two existing physical 
driveways, which it is undisputed could not serve any development of the Sharp property. 
Though the entire decision is instructive, the following is an excerpt of the Kansas decision 
which clearly elucidates the Court's analysis of the issue and makes a stark comparison to how the 
Idaho Court of Appeals handled the issue in this case: 
In Roberts v. Upper Verdigris Watershed, 193 Kan. 15 1,157-59,392 P.2d 914 (1 964) 
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the court stated much the same rule when confronted with a case which dealt with the 
question of the extent of use of an easement. The court stated: 
"The commissioners' report, and only their report, is evidence of the land 
appropriated, the extent of the easement and its use. 
"In Mercantile Co, v. O.H. & G. Rld. Co., 56 Kan. 174,42 Pac. 712, it is stated: 
"'A railroad company seeking to condemn land for a right of way or other use 
connected with the construction and operation of its railroad, under the statute, takes 
only a right to the use of such land as is definitely described in the report of the 
commissioners. The concealed purposes or intentions of the representatives of the 
company or of the board of comnlissioners can confer no rights. The landowner may 
rely implicitly on the report filed. The commissioners in this case condemned a right 
of way across 20 acres only. The law requires the commissioners to embody their 
doings in a written report, and to file the same with county clerk. This report 
becomes the evidence, and the only evidence, of their doings. (The State v. Armell, 
8 Kan. 288; Reisner v. Union Depot & Rld. Co., 27 [Kan.] 382; C.K. & W. Rld. CO. 
v. Grovier, 41 [Kan.] 685 [21 P. 7791.' (Pp. 175, 176 [42 P. 7121.) 
"The above case was cited with approval in our recent case of Sutton v. Frazier, 
183 Kan. 33,325 P.2d 338, where we said: 
"' ... Pursuant to the empowering statue Sunflower took the land definitely 
described in the report of appraisers for the uses specified in the notice. The report 
of the appraisers must show what is taken, and what the landowners part with. 
Nothing is taken by implication or intendment. The landowners may rely implicitly 
on the report filed. This report becomes the evidence and the only evidence of the 
commissioners' doings. (Mercantile Co. v. 0 . H  & G. Rld. Co., 56 Kan. 174,42 Pac. 
712; State v. Armell, 8 Kan. 288; and C.K. & W. Rld. Co. v. Grovier, 41 Kan. 685, 
2 1 Pac. 779.) ...' p43 [325 P.2d 2281. 
"The landowners and the condemner may, and must, rely on the language of the 
commissioners' report as to the extent of the easement and the extent of the use. If 
the landowners are not compensated in$ll for the full use, as set out in the report, 
the condemner can take the full use in the future withoutfurther compensation to the 
landowners. 
"The evidence introduced on appeal from a condemnation award does not become 
a part of the commissioners' report which is filed with the register of deeds and 
determines the extent of the easement and the extent of the use. The injustice that 
would result to the landowners is readily auparent, i f a  condemner could introduce - - -  
evidence as to a limited use for the purpose ofreducing the amount of damages to 
the landowners, and later exercise the full use by virtue of'the commissioners' report. 
"The extent of the easement and the extent bf the us;, that is the rights reqGired, 
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are not questions of fact. They are questions of law to be determined from the 
language used in the commissioners' repo rt.... 
"The condemner contends that it was entitled to show the nature of the detention 
structure which would cause the impoundment of water on the easement condemned, 
the purpose being to show only an infrequent or limited use of the easement. The 
fallacy of the contention is that the nature of the dam or detention structure was not 
made a part of the commissioners' report which controls the extent of the easement 
and the use. 
"It is suggested that watershed districts are a matter of public benefit and their 
construction will be rendered impracticable if damages must be paid in full for the 
value of land which is only infrequently and temporarily inundated. The suggestion 
has no merit. If the condemner desires only an infrequent limited use of the easement 
condemned it need only make certain that the limited use is properly stated in the 
petition and incorporated in the commissioners's report which is filed with the 
register of deeds and governs the extent of the easement and the extent of the use. 
That has not been done in this case. 
"We must conclude that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence as to the 
condemner's fhture intended use which varied the extent of the use set out in the 
commissioners' rep0 rt...." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The above rules were cited authoritatively in Die$nbach v. State Highway 
Commission, 195 Kan. 445,448-49,407 P.2d 228 (1965): 
"The condemner cannot now contend before the jury that it intends only a limited 
use where the right taken is perpetual. In Sutton v Frazier, 183 Kan. 33, 325 P.2d 
228, we held: 
"'In an eminent domain proceeding the report of the appraisers must show what 
is taken, and what the landowners part with. Nothing is taken by implication or 
intendment, and the landowners may rely implicitly on the report filed which 
becomes the evidence and the only evidence of the commissioners' doings.' (Syl. 8.) 
"The landowners are entitled to compensation based on the Cull use which the 
condemner has the right to exercise over the easement condemned as described in the 
condemner's petition and considered by the appraisers. (Roberts v. Upper Verdigris 
Watershed, 193 Kan. 15 1,392 P.2d 914.)" 
See also Spears v .  Kansas City Power &Light b., 203 Kan. 520, 524-25, 455 P.2d 496 
(1969). 
The present case is similar to the above cited cases in that there has been a taking and 
the land taken has subsequently been used in a limited manner. Accordingly, it must first be 
determined whether there has been a reservation of an easement for plaintiffs to have the 
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unlimited use and enjoyment of the land being used in a limited manner. 
An examination of the condemnation petition in the present case reveals that there 
has not been an express reservation of an easement to plaintiffs for their access under the 
City's highway. The pertinent description states; "A Permanent Easement for controlled 
access highway right of way and removal of borrow material over and upon a tract of land 
in ...." (Emphasis supplied.) Although an access road had been provided, there is no 
indication whether the road is to be maintained or whether the City will continue to permit 
plaintiffs to use the road. The City would be within its rights to fence off the area completely 
at any time. Jack Forbes, one of the City's appraisers, gave his opinion as to the existence 
of the access: 
"And in my opinion a prudent and typical investor, who is contemplating buying 
this land for famlland, or whatever you want to say he wants to buy it for, if he would 
look at the plans himself, if he had any qualms himself, or any reservations about 
access from one part to the other, he would contact the city or contact the Department 
of Transportation, which I have. 
"And he would find out that there would be access under that bridge. And he 
would also find out if he needs it, they will give him a legal instrument which it 
allows him to have any reservation or apermanent easementfor ingress and egress. 
"And that's really the true test, in my opinion. And you have no reservations 
about the rights of access from one part of the land to the other." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
Forbes' testimony, based upon contact with the City or Department of Transportation, 
indicates that for total assurance, a legal instrument or permanent easement would need to 
be exchanged between the parties. This testimony clearly indicates that such a reservation 
of easement to plaintiffs does not already exist, even in light of the existence of the access 
road on the project plans. 
The facts in this case can be compared to those in the Hoy case, where the State had 
its easement fenced in such a manner as to allow access to a well. There the court noted that 
the State had not in fact offered to return the land to the owner. The placement of the fence 
was therefore considered a "conditional" condemnation, and its assurance that the 
landowners could use the well was merely promissory. The court concluded it was improper 
to consider evidence of the placement of the fence and the landowner's access thereto in the 
trial to determine damages for the taking. 
We arrive at a similar conclusion in the present case. While the project plans 
apparently do provide for an access road and such a road has been constructed, the rights of 
plaintiffs to the continued use of the road have not been legally established. Therefore, we 
hold that it was improper for the jury to consider the existence of the road and the resulting 
access when determining plaintiffs' damages for the taking. The trial court erred by allowing 
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such testimony. Barcus, 661 P.2d at 810 - 812. 
The Barcus court reversed and remanded for new trial. In that case, the issue arose at the jury trial 
on valuation. In this case, because a separate court trial before the valuation trial was held. 
The Court of Appeals also cites to a portion of Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,596 P.2d 75 
(1978), which refers favorably to California law. California law also supports Appellant's position 
taken in this appeal. 
In the case of County ofSan Diego v. Mary E. Bressi, 229 Cal.Rptr. 44,184 CalApp.3d 112 
(1986), the condemnor took an avigation easement over Bressi's property. The easement contained 
very broad language providing that any aircraft of any type could fly over the Bressi property; 
however, at trial the condemnor sought to introduce evidence that it did not intend to have jets use 
the airspace. Bressi argued that the resolution of necessity which defined the taking clearly allowed 
for jets to fly over her property and that she could therefore assess damages considering that fact. 
The California Court of Appeals summarized the issue as follows: 
Bressi's evidentiaty argument is quite simple. She says we must focus on the 
language of the resolution of necessity. That resolution subjects her property to overflight 
by any aircraft including, but not limited to, jumbo jets or any other contrivance yet to be 
invented for flight in space. She claims that in light of the resolution, the County should not 
be allowed to present evidence contradicting the resolution and thus compensate her for a 
lesser taking. Bressi metaphorically asserts the County cannot have its 'take' and eat it too 
by introducing evidence showing that Palomar Airport will in all likelihood never expand 
to serve commercial aircraft. 
The County responds by saying that we must focus on the important role of the jury 
in the judicial process. The County contends that Bressi's doctrinaire argument will merely 
frustrate the jury's role which is to determine the fair market value of the property taken. If 
the jury is deprived of evidence relating to all hture plans affecting the development of 
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Palomar Airport it will lack the essential evidence which it needs to decide true market value. 
We frankly admit that each argument has certain appeal. Eachrecommended solution 
contains elements of logic and fairness. Unfortunately, each proposed solution creates the 
potential for unfairness. If we accevt the Countv's argument Bressi faces the risk she will - 
hot be filly compensated for what t ie  County has taken. If we accept Bressi's argument the 
County faces the risk the iury will compensate her for an amount greater than the true market " .  - 
value of her property. As we explain we conclude the preferable approach is the one 
recommended by Bressi. Bressi, 229 Ca1.Rptr. at 49; 184 CalApp.3d at 121. 
The Court then discussed the CaliforniaConstitution, which provides forjust compensation, 
as well as California statutes which require the condemnor to enter a resolution of necessity which 
conclusively defines the taking. The Court held: "The County may not, however, introduce evidence 
which purports to limit the taking by contradicting the resolution itself." Bressi, 229 Cal.Rptr. at 
The Bressi case is closely analogous to the case at hand. ACHD's Order of Condemnation 
takes all access to Eagle Road other than the residential access depicted on the project plans. ACHD 
should not be allowed to claim that it is not taking access when that claim clearly contradicts the 
plain language of its own Order, yet that is what the Court of Appeals has allowed them to do. 
Additional California authority which supports Appellant's position can be found in The 
People ex rel. Department ofPublic Works v. Sckultz Company, 123 Cal.App.2d 925,268 P.2d 117 
(1954), and Coachella Valley Water District v. Western Allied Properties, 235 Cal.Rptr. 725, 190 
Cal.App.3d 969 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1987). 
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D. The Court of Appeals has declined to follow or even discuss and reject the body of case law from 
other iurisdictions which is directly on point on this issue. dismissing the decisions from other 
jurisdictions with a passing; comment 
In Footnote two of the Court of Appeals opinion reads in part: "While these cases may be 
somewhat instructive, each state has developed its own individualized body of statutory and 
decisional law on this topic which appear to be state specific or otherwise distinguishable." 
Appellant Sharp provided the Court of Appeals with more than thirty (30) citations to 
decisions from other jurisdictions which were directly on point and supported the Appellant's 
position.53 The Court of Appeals declined to even discuss the reasoning or the rationale of a single 
53 Application of City of Great Bend, Kansas, 869 P.2d 587,254 Kan. 699 (1994); Atkinson v. Carolina 
Power & Light Co., 121 S.E.2d 743,239 S.C. 150 (1961); Barcus v. City ofKansas City, 661 P.2d 806,s 
Kan.App2d 506 (1983); Carolina Cenlral Gas Company v. Hyder, 241 N.C. 639,86 S.E.2d 458 (1955); Chester 
Litho, Inc. v. Palisades Inter. Park Com 'n, 27 N.Y.2d 323,266 N.E.2d 229,317 N.Y.2d 761 (1971); Consolidated 
Gas Supply Corp. v. Reilly, 414 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1979); Coos Bay Logging Co. v. Barclay et al., 159 Or. 272,79 P.2d 
672 (1938); County ofSan Diego v. M a v  E. Bressi, 229 Cal.Rptr. 44, 184 Cal.App.3d 112 (1986); Danish 
Vennerforning and Old Peoples Home v. State of Nebraska, Department of Roads, 19 1 Neb. 774,2 17 N.W.2d 8 19 
(1974); East Bay Utility Municipal Utility Dist. v. City ofLodi et al., 120 Cal.App. 740,s P.2d 532 (1932); Gable V. 
State ofNebraska Department of Roads, 176 Neb. 789, 127 N.W.2d 475 (1964); Hickey v. Town ofBurrillville et 
al., 713 A.2d 781 (R.I. 1998); Hudson v. City ofShawnee,246 Kan. 395,790 P.2d 903 (1990); Idaho-Western Ry. 
CO. V. Columbia Conference of Evangelical Luthern Augustana Synod, 20 Idaho 568,119 P. 60 (191 1); Kahlen V. 
State, 223 N.Y. 383,119 N.E. 883 (1918); Kentucky Fried Chicken of Warren v. Flanders, 461 A.2d 927 (R.I. 
1983); Larsen v. Village ofLava Hot Springs, 88 Idaho 64,396 P.2d 471 (1964); Levcowich v. Town of Westerly, 
492 A.2d 141 (R.I. 1985); Little et al. v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 150 Neb. 864,36 N.W.2d 261 (1949); 
Louisville & N. Ry. Co. et. al. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. oflndiana, 11 1 N.E. 802, 184 I~ld. 531 (1916); 
North Carolina State Highway et al. v. Black et al., 239 N.C. 198,79 S.E.2d 778 (1 954); Northwest Quadrant Pure 
Waters District No. 1 v. Payne Beach Association, Inc., et al., 38 A.D.2d 668,327 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1971); Oklahoma 
Turnpike Authority v Burk, 1966 OK 113,415 P.2d 1001 (1966); Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Waller, 80 
Idaho 105,326 P.2d 388 (1958); Peebles v. Canal Authority, 254 So2d 232 (1971); The People ex rel. Department 
of Public Works v. Schultz Company, 123 Cal.App.2d 925,268 P.2d 117 (1954); Perkins et ux. v. State, 150 S.W.2d 
157 (1941); Portneuf-Marsh Etc. Co. v. PortneufIrr. Co., 19 Idaho 483,114 P. 19 (191 1); Rawson- Works Lumber 
CO. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 P. 74 (1914); Richardson v. Big Indian Creek Watershed Conservancy District 
of Gage andJefferson Counties, 181 Neb. 776, 151 N.W.2d 283 (1967); Reisenauer v. Staie ofldaho, 120 Idaho 
36,813 P.2d 375 (Idaho App. 1991); Roberts v. Upper Verdigris Cl'atershedJoint District No. 24,392 P.2d 914, 
193 Kan. 151 (1964); Schiewe v. Farwell, 125 Idaho 46,867 P.2d 920 (1993); Shell Pipe Line Corporation v. 
Woolfolket al., 331 Mo. 410,53 S.W.2d 917 (1932); St. Patrick's Church., Whilney Point v. State, 30 A.D.2d 473, 
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one of those decisions and have instead concluded, without explaining their reasoning, that Idaho 
is unique among all the states to ever consider the issues presented in this appeal. 
The overwhelming majority of case law on the issues in this appeal supports the Appellant's 
position. See generally Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, Chapter IB, Determining the 
Properly Rights Acquired and Dealing With Modifications or Attempted Modifications to the 
Taking. The Respondent, Ada County Highway District, did not cite a single decision from any 
jurisdiction which supports its position in this case, nor did the Court of Appeals cite to any decision 
from any other jurisdiction to support its holding. 
Other jurisdictions have procedures which are very similar to the procedures in Idaho. The 
cases cited by Appellant in support of her position were from a variety of jurisdictions. The 
similarity between the condemnation procedures used in those states and Idaho's procedure is 
blatantly evident from a review of the statutes in those states.54 
294 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1968); State v. Smith, 25 Wash.2d 540, 171 P.2d 853 (1946); State ex rel. Polson Logging CO. v. 
Superior Courtfor Grays Harbor County et al., 11 Wash.2d 545, 119 P.2d 694 (1941); State of Missouri ex rel. 
State Highway Commission v. Johnson et al., 287 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. 1956); Sullivan v. Marcello, Director of Public 
Works, 100 R.I. 241,214 A.2d 181 (1965); Vallone v. City of Cranston, Department of Public Works (two cases), 
97 R.I. 248, 197 A.2d 310 (1964); Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Webb et al., 196 Va. 555,84 S.E.2d 735 
(1954); Washington Water Power Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho 595, 115 P. 682 (191 1); White v. Natural Gas Pipeline 
Co. ofAmerica, 444 S.W.2d 298 (1969); WoIfe v. State of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 292,239 N.E.2d 517,292 
N.Y.S.2d 635 (1968). 
54 See California - Cal. Code $1240.040 Resolution of necessity; Florida- Fla. Stat. ch. 73.021 Petition; 
contents; Indiana - Ind. Code $3 1-1 1-1-2. Condemnation proceedings -Parties- Complaint- Contents- Venue.; 
Kansas - Kan. Stat. Ann $26-501 Contents of petition.; Missouri- Mo.Rev.Stat. $523.010 Lands may be 
condemned, when- petition-parties- power of public utility to condemn certain lands, limitations; Nebraska - Neb. 
Rev. Stat. 576-701.01 Petition of condemner; contents.; New York- Em. Dom. Proc. 5402 Filing of acquisition 
maps; vesting; North Carolina - N.C. Gen. Stat. 540A-41. Institution of action and deposit; Oklahoma- Okla. Stat. 
tit. 27 5 2 Condemnation procedure for state lands; Oregon - Or. Rev. Stat. 9 35.265 (1997) Commencement of 
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California's procedure is somewhat different in that the statutes require that an Order of 
Condemnation (known as a Resolution ofNecessity) be adopted, and proscribe the contents of the 
Resolution. Cal. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1245.210-1245.270. InIdaho there is animplied requirement 
that an Order of Condemnation be issued rather than a statutory requirement. LC. $40-13 lO(3). 
However, this does not mean that cases decided by the California courts do not contain instructive 
reasoning and helpful analysis in dealing with this issue. 
The Court of Appeals chose to ignore all of the cases cited by Appellant, including those 
from states with nearly identical condemnation statutes and procedures. 
Even assuming that Idaho were completely unique in its taw of eminent domain and wholly 
different from the other jurisdictions to consider this issue, the reasoning and rationale of the courts 
which have considered cases on this issue is applicable. If that reasoning is rejected by the Idaho 
Courts, it would be helpful to both condemnors and condemnees in the State of Idaho to have clear 
guidance that the rationale applied in other jurisdictions does not apply in our State, and why. 
E. The Court of Ap~eals has issued a decision on a substantive legal issue of first impression not 
heretofore determined bv the Supreme Court: which will have broad implications for evely 
governmental agencv and utility in Idaho that has been authorized to condemn real vropertv for 
public purposes, as well as every owner of private propem who will face condemnation 
There is no Idaho decision prior to the Court of Appeals decision in this case which addresses 
the meaning or effect of orders of condemnation. The Court of Appeals has held that Orders of 
action; jurisdiction; Or. Rev. Stat. 5 35.255 (1997) Content of complaint; Rhode Island - R.I. Gen. Law $37-6-14. 
Filing of condemnation papers- Vesting of title- Availability of state treasury funds.; Texas- Tex.Code Ann. 
$21.0 12 Condemnation petition.; Washiion- Wash. Rev. Code $8.01.010 Petition for appropriation- Contents. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW - 28 
Condemnation, which purport to define the scope of the taking, do not in fact do so: 
The [trial] court concluded that the order of condemnation was not determinative to defining 
the scope of the take. For the reasons stated above, we agree as a matter of law and affirm 
the district court's subsequent ruling that Sharp's access rights were not altered by ACHD's 
actions. (Court of Appeals decision, page 5.) 
The Order of Condemnation is signed by all the ACHD Commissioners and authorizes a 
condemnation action to proceed. Under the Court of Appeals decision, the condemnation Complaint 
subsequently filed can reflect wholly different property and property rights to be acquired, with no 
authorization from the condemnor and no amending order or resolution. Yet, pursuant to I.C. 3 40- 
An order of the highway district commissioners entered upon its minutes that the land sought 
to be condemned is necessary for a public highway and public use shall be prima facia 
evidence of that fact. 
The curious result is that the Order establishes public use and necessity but does not establish the 
scope ofthe take. The Court of Appeals does not explain why the Order is effective in some respects 
and ineffective in others, nor can any condemnee reasonably be expected to make such a distinction. 
F. The Court of Ameats has aplied the Supreme Court's decision in Rueth v. State. which was an 
inverse condemnation case, to the facts of a direct condemnation case, which represents an extension 
of the Supreme Court's holding in Rueth which has never been endorsed by the Supreme Court 
There is a significant difference between direct and inverse condemnation cases. While both 
stem from the power to take private property for public use, in a direct condemnation case the 
acquiring agency (condemnor) is admitting that they are taking private property. The condemnor in 
a direct case alleges that the taking of private property is necessary for a public use and defines the 
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property and property rights to be acquired, prior to the Court of Appeals decision in this case. 
In contrast, in an inverse condemnation case, the condemnor denies that it is taking property. 
The property owner alleges that a taking of private property has occurred, either because there has 
been a physical invasion of the owner's private property, or because there has been excessive 
government regulation of the property, or because unreasonable conditions have been placed on the 
property owner as conditions of development of the property (exactions). 
There is a distinct body of law for direct condemnation cases and a separate and distinct body 
of law for inverse condemnation cases. While the rules regarding valuation issues are the same in 
both types of cases, all of the procedural rules are different because the processes are so different. 
In addition, there are several sub-sections of law in inverse cases - physical takings, exactions and 
regulatory takings. 
The Court of Appeals decision in this case is an indication that the Court did not understand 
the unique issues and complexities involved in condemnation. Condemnation cases are unique in 
the law. The Court's application of inverse condemnation case law in a direct condemnation case 
when the issue is not one of valuation reflects a lack of familiarity with this area of the law. 
The Court of Appeals decision reads as follows on pages 5 and 6:  
In Reuth v State, 100 Idaho 203, 222-23, 596 P.2d 75, 94-95 (1978), the Idaho 
Supreme Court discussed the role of trial courts in condemnatiori proceedings: 
The trial court will make the determination of the taking issues which will be 
reflected, as in California, in instructions which advise the jury that there has 
been a taking, and the nature of the property right taken where the court 
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concludes that the taking is less than a fee. Additionally, and as appears to 
be the practice in California, it is desirable that the trial court enter findings 
and conclusions pertinent to that issue, and pertinent to any issue other than 
that ofjust compensation. 
(Emphasis added.) Sharp asserts on appeal that Rueth is inapplicable because it was an 
inverse condemnation case. However, the Reutk Court approvingly cited Brock v. Stale 
Highway Commission, 404 P.2d 934, 940 (Kan. 1965), and quoted: "As in any other 
condemnation case, in context and in its entirety, simply defines the access that is available 
to the Sharp property exactly as it exists." 
The district court in this case looked at all ofthe evidence, especially the language of ACHD's 
complaint, and determined that no access was being condemned because Sharp's rights of 
access to ~ a ~ l e  ~ o a d  were unchanged by the ACEID'S actions. The court concluded that the 
order of condemnation was not determinative to defining the scope of the take. For the 
reasons stated above, we agree as a matter of law and affirm the district court's subsequent 
ruling that Sharp's access rights were not altered by ACHD's actions. 
First, both California and Kansas cases which are direct condemnation cases clearly support 
Appellant's position on appeal, as discussed previously herein. Second, the Reutk inverse case cited 
approvingly to Brock, which was also an inverse case. 
Third, the Court of Appeals in this portion of its decision ignores the fact that the trial court 
found there was no change in Sharp's physical, existing residential driveway access, and that future 
legal rights of access may or may not be present. There is a difference between physical and legal 
access.55 Although Sharp's physical residential access remained in place, the plain language of 
5s See e.g. MacBean v. St. Paul Title Insurance, 169 N.J.Super. 502,405 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1979); Hocking 
v Title Insurance & Trust Co., 37 Cal.2d 644, 234 P.2d 625 (195 1); Krause v. Title & Trust Co., 390 So.2d 805 
fFla.App. 5 Dist. 1980); Gales v. Chicago Title Insurance Company, 813 S.W.2d 10 (Miss. 1991); Title & Trust Co. 
v. Barrows, 381 So.2d 1088 (1979). These cases are title insurance cases that have addressed the specific issue of 
legal VS. physical access and have all found the two are separate and distinct. 
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ACRD's Order of Condemnation presently condemned all legal access rights to andfrom her 
property other than the narrow, existing access which it was undisputed cannot be used in the 
development ofthe property as ofthe date of taking. 
G. The Court of A~aeals  Did Not Address the Critical Issue Presented on Appeal 
The first and primary issue presented on appeal was as follows: 
1. Is the ACHD bound by its official Order of Condemnation, which unambiguously states 
that all access to and from Eagle Road and the Sharp property was permanently taken, except 
for the access provided in the project plans? 
The Court of Appeals, rather than addressing that issue, re-defined it as follows: 
The issue of whether a civil complaint of condemnation supercedes an administrative order 
of the highway district commissioners, for purposes of determining what property interest is 
being condemned, is one of first impression in Idaho and involves a question of statutoly 
interpretation. 
In re-defining the issue in this way, the Court of Appeals presumed, but did. not discuss, that there was 
a conflict in this case between the complaint and the administrative order of the highway district. In 
fact, the order of condemnation was attached to the complaint as an exhibit and there is nothing in 
the complaint which is inconsistent with the order. The Complaint did not describe access as being 
taken, but it included the order of condemnation which diddescribe that all rights of access other than 
those depicted in the project plans were being taken. The Complaint did not state that access rights, 
as described in the order with the other property and property rights to be acquired, were not being 
taken. Therefore, the Complaint could be construed as taking access. 
The Court treated the issue on appeal as though it were a question of statutory impression 
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construing LC. Section 7-707 and I.C. Section 40-1310(3): 
Idaho Code Section 7-707, appearing in chapter 7 entitled "Eminent Domain," pertains 
to the condemnation complaint and sets forth what it "must contain," including "a description 
of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether the same includes the whole, or only a 
part, of an entire parcel or tract." Idaho Code Section 40-1310(3), appearing in a chapter 
entitled "Highway Districts," provides that the director of the highway district: "shall have the 
right, subject to the order of the highway district commissioners, to begin action in the 
highway district in the district court of the county in which the district is situated, to condemn 
the land necessary for the right of way for the highway, under the provisions of chapter 7, title 
7, Idaho Code," whenever the director cannot agree with any person for the purchase of the 
land. This section m h e r  provides: "An order of the highway district commissioners entered 
upon its minutes that the land sought to be condemned is necessary for a public highway and 
public use shall be prima facia evidence of that fact. Neither of these code sections purport 
to state whether it is the order of condemnation or the complaint initiating the eminent domain 
action that is determinative in defining what land or what rights are sought to be condemned. 
It is this Court's opinion, however, that I.C. Section 7-707 is more specific, and, perforce, 
controlling. 
Idaho Code Section 7-707 requires that the land sought to be condemned be 
speciiically described in the complain, whereas I.C. Section 40-1310(3) only states that an 
order of condemnation enteredupon the commissioners' minutes will beprimafacia evidence 
of public use. While LC. Section 40-1310(3) requires that such an order refer to the land 
sought to be condemned, it does not require a specific description of the land, as does I.C. 
Section 7-707. Furthermore, LC. Section 7-707, on the other hand, specifically anticipates 
that the complaint will be filed with a district court and thus published to and served upon the 
landowner. 
In defining the issue this way, the Court of Appeals failed to consider two important aspects 
of the issue presented on appeal. First, the issue on appeal was whether or not the highway district 
is bound by its order of condemnation, not whether it was bound by its complaint. The difference is 
significant because the order of condemnation is the means by which the condemning authority acts, 
much like a corporate resolution. The order of condemnation is the instrument which officially 
authorizes the taking and which defines the rights to be acquired. The issue on appeal was whether 
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or not such a resolution binds the condemnor, as a corporate resolution would bind the corporation. 
In this case, the condemning authority never entered a subsequent resolution amending its original 
order and redefining the taking. Therefore, if the order of condemnation is binding on the condemnor, 
attempts to take property and property rights other than those described in the order would be 
essentially ulta vires, as there would be no authority from the government agency/condemnor to 
deviate from its official order. 
The complaint is a document drafted by attorneys for the condemning agency, which is 
supposed to effectuate the taking of the property rights the condemning agency has officially 
determined, via its order of condemnation, that it desires to acquire. Absent some official direction 
to the contrary, the complaint should therefore seek to acquire the property and property rights 
described in the order of condemnation. In this case, the complaint attached the order of 
condemnation and ACHD never entered a subsequent order or an alternative direction to acquire 
different rights than those described in the complaint. Even at the court trial in this matter ACHD 
representative Larry Sale testified that the effect of the language in the order may be to take access 
from the Sharp property. 
Second, the issue presented on appeal called upon the Court to determine whether ACHD was 
bound by its order of condemnation. By failing to address this issue and hold either "yes" or "no," 
there is an unanswered question regarding the effect of orders of condemnation in instances where 
a lawsuit is not filed. For example, what happens when ACHD or another government agency 
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determines that negotiation with a property owner has failed and enters an order of condemnation, 
only to then settle with the owner prior to a lawsuit being filed? If the owner relies on the order of 
condemnation and the rights described therein as having been acquired, can the condemnor re-define 
the rights acquired and claim that its own order of condemnation is mere form language and not to 
be relied upon? Certainly the Court of Appeals decision gives ACHD an argument that its orders of 
condemnation are not binding and are simply internal documents not to be relied upon by others. 
Every other condemnor could make the same argument. 
Another consequence of the Court of Appeals re-definition of the issue is that it fails to 
consider the practical realities involved in the way government agencies use their orders of 
condemnation. For example, assume that an order of condemnation is entered, a complaint is filed, 
a judgment is entered, and the condemnation case concludes. A year later the property owner goes 
into ACHD to apply for a development application. ACHD of course has on file the order of 
condemnation relating to that property, which states that all access has been taken, and can use that 
language as a basis for denying access to the owner, claiming that the access was condemned. Unless 
the judgment entered in the condemnation case is also on file at ACHD and clearly states that the 
order of condemnation does not have any effect or that access is not taken, what is to prevent ACHD 
from using its orders in this way? In fact, there is evidence in the record, in the Offer of Proof, 
Affidavit of Pat Dobie, that the Idaho Transportation Department uses orders of condemnation in 
exactly that way. 
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The practical reality is that condemnors keep their own orders on file, and may or may not 
keep complaints and judgments on file. The orders of condemnation are used by the condemning 
agency to determine what rights have been acquired, not complaints or judgments. Therefore, 
condemning agencies use the language of their instruments to bind property owners, yet when 
property owners seek damages based on the language of those orders in condemnation proceedings, 
the condemnor is allowed to escape the language of its orders pursuant to the Court of Appeals 
decision in this case. This result is inequitable and warrants review. 
H. The Court of A~peals decision contains statements which are not based on any information in the 
record and which does not accurately reflect the facts of what transpired in this case 
There are portions of the Court of Appeals decision which are not based on the facts in the 
record and do not accurately reflect what transpired in this case. Footnote three reads: 
From this point on, communication between the parties broke down, witheachparty assuming 
its current position was understood bv the other. Sharp thereaftex spent thousands of dollars 
hiring experts to value her property, based on her erroneous assunlption that all of her future 
rights of access were being condemned by the ACHD. This caused each party to find the 
other's offer of settlement unreasonable. Much of this dispute could have been avoided with 
a simple phone call to clarify the matter of future access to Eagle Road. 
The "erroneous assumption" made by Sharp, according to the Court of Appeals, was that 
access was being taken. However, as the facts in the record clearly establish, Sharp had been advised 
by ACHD's Chief Right of Way negotiator that her access rights were being condemned, and that 
although she could continue to use her existing residential driveways for the time being, her access 
was being taken for the project. ACHD's Order of Condemnation unambiguously and clearly stated 
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that all access rights were being taken. Nothing disclosed in discovery ever indicated that access was 
not, in fact, being taken. In fact, ACHD never took the position that its Order of Condemnation did 
not inf act take access until oral argument in rebuttal to Sharp S closing argument at the close of the 
Court Trial in this matter. Even during the Court Trial, when Lany Sale (ACHD employee) was on 
the stand and the Order of Condemnation was admitted into evidence and discussed with Mr. Sale, 
AClTD offeered no evidence that the Order of Condemnation did not in,fact take access. 
Given the fact that ACHD represented throughout the entire case and even through the entire 
Court Trial, until rebuttal argument, that access was being taken by the Order of Condemnation, it is 
unreasonable to expect that Sharp's counsel should have called ACHD to ask whether or not they 
really meant what they were saying. The practical reality is that in a condemnation case the 
condemnee relies on the government's definition of the taking. Here, Sharp and her lawyers did that, 
only to be told by the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals that this was unreasonable, unfourtunate 
behavior which "could have been avoided." 
The record in this matter establishes that the dispute could have been avoided if ACHD had 
been willing to live with its language in its official Order of Condemnation defining the rights to be 
acquired, or, if ACHD had determined that diferent rights were to be acquired, ACHD should have 
clearly stated that in its Complaint, instead of attaching the Order of Condemnation to the Complaint 
and failing to state that ACHD did not wish to be bound by its terms. ACHD has the obligation to 
define the taking and ascertain just compensation, not the property owner. In this case the owner 
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relied on ACHD's representations regarding the taking of access. When ACHD learned how much 
access rights would cost, it suddenly took the abrupt change in position that it did not want the access 
rights and was not seeking to acquire them. ACHD argued that its own documents to the contrary, 
the Right of Way Agent's memo and the official Order of Condemnation, were meaningless and of 
no effect. Both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals sanctioned this argument. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals decision, page 6,  reads: 
Sharp contends that based upon ACHD's order of condemnation, she reasonably believed 
that ACHD sought to condemn allfuture rights of access to Eagle Road from her remailling 
property. 
That was not Sharp's contention. It was ACHD"s argument that if any rights of access were acquired, 
they were only future access rights. Sharp's contention was that the plain, unambiguous language of 
the Order of Condemnation took, as of the date of summons in this case, all access rights to Sharp's 
remaining property. The Order said: 
7. That all rights of access to. from. and between the right-of-way of the vublic wav and all 
of the contirmous remaining real provemi of the named owners. or rep- shall be 
extinguished and orohibited except for access, if any, in the project hereinabove described. 
It was undisputed that the only access in the project plans showed two substandard residential 
driveways which could not serve any use of the property other than its current residential use. It was 
also undisputed that as of the date of summons and valuation, the highest and best use of the Sharp 
property was commercial, not residential. Therefore, anyone valuing the property as of the date of 
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taking (the date of summons), would value the property in the after condition assuming all access 
rights to Eagle road had been taken as the Order of Condemnation plainly stated. There is no legal 
or factual basis for assigning a temporal "future" concept to the access rights acquired. Nothing in 
the record supports that future, as opposed to present, access rights were acquired. 
The Court of Appeals stated on page 7 of its decision: 
The district court in this case looked at all of the evidence, especially the language of ACHD's 
complaint, and determined that no access was being condemned because Sharp's rights of 
access to Eagle Road were unchanged by the ACHD's actions. 
In fact, as supported by the Record, Judge McKee did not "especially [consider] the language of 
ACHD's complaint." ACHD never even made the argument that the complaint rather than the Order 
of Condemnation was controlling until the Motion for Reconsideration, months afler the Court Trial 
and after this Court had denied Sharp's motion seeking permission for an interlocutory appeal. The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by Judge McKee make Q.Q reference to the 
complaint. (R., pgs. 98 - 106). McKee decided the Order of Condemnation was "irrelevant" and 
"ambiguous," not that the Complaint controlled. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals did not decide this case on the facts presented in the record. In addition, 
the Court of Appeals did not discuss any of the authority from other jurisdictions which supports 
Appellant Sharp's position, and which is the majority rule. The Court of Appeals did not cite a single 
case from any other jurisdiction which supports the position it has taken and judicially legislated a 
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new rule. In fact the only case the Court of Appeals cited at all is Reuth v. State, which is an inverse 
condemnation case. Upon closer review, the authorities cited approvingly in the Reuth case support 
Appellant's position herein. 
There is an overwhelming amount of solid legal authority cited by Appellant Sharp which 
supports her position in this appeal. The Court of Appeals declined to even discuss or d i s t in~ish  any 
of the cases cited. The Court of Appeals has determined that Idaho is unique among all states in the 
area of condemnation, without so much as mention of any review of the statutes from other 
jurisdictions (which, in fact, are for the most part similar to Idaho's statutes). 
The Court of Appeals decision will have broad implications to both condemnors and property 
owners. It allows the trial court in condemnation cases to have the ultimate decision regarding what 
property rights the condemnor is acquiring and for which it must pay. The decision has extreme 
negative consequences to bothcondemnors and condemnees and therefore warrants review by Idaho's 
highest Court. 
Sharp respectfully asks this Court to accept her Petition for Review in this matter. 
DATED this 22nd day of May, 2001. 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
HEATHER A. CUNNINGH&, of the firm 
Attorneys for Appellant C/ 
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